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Anglo Germany Agreement

The Anglo-German naval agreement establishes a ratio according to which the total tonnage of the Kriegsmarine should permanently be 35% of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy. [1] It was registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series on July 12, 1935. [2] The agreement was terminated by Adolf Hitler on April 28, 1939. The German Government, for its part, also considers that the agreement it has just concluded with Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom, which it considers to be a permanent and definitive agreement with effect from today between the two Governments, will facilitate the conclusion of a general agreement on this issue between all the maritime Powers of the world. When the Kriegsmarine began planning a war with Britain in May 1938, the Navy`s chief of operations, Commander Hellmuth Heye, concluded that the best strategy for the Kriegsmarine was a fleet of submarine warcruisers, light cruisers, and armored ships operating in tandem. [50] He criticized the existing construction priorities dictated by the agreement, as there was no realistic possibility that a German “balanced fleet” would defeat the Royal Navy. [50] In response, senior German naval officers began advocating a move to a cruiser war fleet that would pursue a guerrilla strategy to attack the British merchant navy, but they were rejected by Hitler, who insisted that Germany build a “balanced fleet.” Such a fleet would attempt a Mahanian strategy to gain maritime supremacy through a decisive battle with the Royal Navy in the North Sea. [51] Historians such as Joseph Maiolo, Geoffrey Till, and the authors of the Official History of the Kriegsmarine have agreed with Chatfield`s assertion that a cruiser war fleet offered Germany the best chance of harming the uk`s power and that the UK strategically benefited by ensuring that such a fleet was not built in the 1930s. [52] At the Munich Conference that led to the Munich Agreement in September 1938, Hitler told Neville Chamberlain that if the UK`s policy was to “make it clear in certain circumstances” that the UK could intervene in a war on the European continent, the political terms of the agreement no longer existed and Germany should denounce it. This led Chamberlain to mention them in the Anglo-German Declaration of September 30, 1938. [60] In recent days, representatives of the German government and Her Majesty`s Government have held talks in the United Kingdom, the main objective of which was to pave the way for a general conference on naval arms control.

I am now very pleased to inform Your Excellency that Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom has formally accepted the proposal of the German Government discussed during these talks that the future strength of the German Navy should be 35:100 in relation to the total strength of the fleet of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Her Majesty`s Government of the United Kingdom considers this proposal to be a contribution of the utmost importance to the cause of the future limitation of naval forces. They also consider that the agreement they have just concluded with the German Government, which they now regard as a permanent and definitive agreement between the two governments, will facilitate the conclusion of a general agreement on the restriction of maritime transport between all the maritime powers of the world. 3. With regard to point (c) of the above explanations, I have the honour to inform you that Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom has taken note of the reservation contained therein and has recognised it in the law set out therein, provided that the ratio of 35:100 is maintained in the absence of an agreement to the contrary between the two Governments. In early March 1935, talks to discuss the extent and extent of German rearmament in Berlin between Hitler and Simon were postponed when Hitler took offense at a British government white paper justifying a higher defense budget on the grounds that Germany was violating the Treaty of Versailles, and he claimed to have contracted a “cold.” Between Hitler`s “restoration” and Simon`s visit, the German government took the opportunity to formally reject all the Versailles clauses on land and air disarmament. For Germany, the Anglo-German naval agreement was to mark the beginning of an Anglo-German alliance against France and the Soviet Union,[3] while for Britain, the Anglo-German naval agreement was to be the beginning of a series of arms control agreements concluded to limit German expansionism. The Anglo-German naval agreement was controversial both then and thereafter because the 35:100 tonnage ratio gave Germany the right to build a navy beyond the borders set out in the Treaty of Versailles, and London had concluded the agreement without consulting Paris or Rome. Until 1938, the only advantage the Germans had of the agreement was to threaten to renounce it in order to pressure London to accept continental Europe as Germany`s legitimate sphere of influence. [57] At a meeting on April 16, 1938 between Sir Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Germany, and Hermann Goering, he stated that he had never been appreciated in England, and he bitterly regretted that Mr. Hitler had ever accepted at that time without getting anything in return.

This had been a mistake, but Germany would not remain in a state of inferiority to a hostile Britain in this regard and would not build a 100% base. [58] In December 1934, a secret cabinet committee met to discuss the situation caused by German rearmament. .